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Clarity, Coherence and Context
Three Priorities for Sustainable  
Peacebuilding
Cedric de Coning 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary 
This paper will focus on three challenges that should inform the 2010 
Review of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, namely: (1) develop-
ing the UN peacebuilding concept and operational model; (2) signifi-
cantly stepping-up efforts to improve system-wide coherence; and (3) 
seriously implementing the principle of local ownership. 
  
 There is a need to revisit and clarify exactly what it is the UN 
understands with the peacebuilding concept, and the Peace-
building Commission is ideally suited to be the forum where 
such a debate should take place.  
 
 Our peacebuilding efforts are challenged by deep-rooted co-
herence dilemmas. Instead of glossing over these dilemmas, 
the Peacebuilding Commission should be a strategic market-
place where these dilemmas can be debated and managed. 
 
 In order to improve the sustainability of peace operations the 
UN Peacebuilding Commission will need to focus on three  
critical areas, namely local ownership, local context and local 
capabilities. Peacebuilding that focus only on building the ex-
ecutive branch of the state is not a good recipe for a sustain-
able peace. Investment in the immediate aftermath of a conflict 
should be primarily focused on developing capacity so that so-
cieties are empowered to manage their own downstream deve-
lopment. Local social capital and inherent capacities should be 
identified, recognised and used as the basis for further devel-
opment. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The nexus between development, governance and security has become 
the central focus of the international effort to manage transitions, and 
peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective approach under 
which the dimensions of conflict management, security, humanitarian 
action, governance, rule of law, human rights and development can be 
brought together under one common framework.1 The international 
                                                 
I am grateful to my colleagues in the ‘Visioning the Future of the UN Peacebuilding Ar-
chitecture’ project for their helpful comments, in particular Prof. Richard Caplan and 
Prof. Roland Paris. The current paper builds on a background paper, “Development and 
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debate about the need for, and appropriate role of, peacebuilding cul-
minated, as the centrepiece of the UN reform proposals of the 2005 
World Summit, in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Com-
mission.  
 
This paper is a modest attempt to take stock of what we know about 
peacebuilding in general, and the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 
particular. It aims to suggest how, in the context of the 2010 review 
process, the United Nations peacebuilding community can identify a 
few priority areas on which to focus.  
 
This paper argues that our understanding of the peacebuilding concept 
is closely interlinked with our notion of sustainability. It will focus on 
three challenges that have the potential to significantly improve our 
peacebuilding practice. These three areas for review are:  
 
(1) Improving our understanding of the peacebuilding concept 
through encouraging formal and informal debate, and the insti-
tutionalisation of a specific peacebuilding model in the United 
Nations; 
(2) Significantly stepping up efforts to improve system-wide 
coherence, including our understanding of the limits of coher-
ence; and 
(4) Meaningfully operationalising the principle of local owner-
ship, including finding more creative ways to balance the need 
for predictable international models on the one hand, and local 
context on the other. 
  
Taken together, these three challenges represent opportunities for pol-
icy action that have the potential to enhance our collective ability to 
facilitate more sustainable peacebuilding processes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
Peace-Building: The Challenges of Consistency and Sustainability”, commissioned by the 
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations in 2008. 
 
1  C.H. de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Inte-
grated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, Security in Practice No. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, 2007), p.3. 
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2.Peacebuilding and the Sustainabil-
ity Dilemma 
The emergence of peacebuilding should be understood in the context 
of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict 
management system.  
 
Peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective approach under 
which the political, security, rule of law, governance, human rights 
and development dimensions of these international interventions can 
be brought together under one common strategic framework.2 Whilst 
there is no one common definition, approach or model for peacebuild-
ing that has gained widespread acceptance, one can identify a number 
of common characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and 
a half of peacebuilding practice.3  
 
The first is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with securing or 
consolidating the peace. It is concerned with preventing a lapse, or 
relapse, into violent conflict. Peacebuilding is aimed at consolidating 
the peace by addressing those conflict factors that may, in the short 
and medium term, threaten a lapse, or relapse into conflict, as well as 
addressing the root causes of conflicts, that may threaten the peace 
over the long term. In Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, for instance, 
such short-term conflict factors may include land and ownership dis-
putes, youth unemployment, poor social services and impunity caused 
by weak social-justice systems, whilst the root causes are related to 
the structural inequalities inherent in society.4 There is thus a conflict 
prevention aspect that is central to our understanding of peacebuild-
ing. However, people at all levels, including those intimately engaged 
with peacebuilding in the field on a daily basis, still find it difficult to 
make sense of the concept. On the one hand it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to distinguish from some aspects of peacekeeping in the im-
mediate aftermath of conflict, and on the other it is difficult to distin-
guish from development.  
 
                                                 
2  See for instance the 2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Hu-
man Rights for All report of the UN Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 
2005), and the 2006, Delivering as One report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel on System-wide Coherence (New York: United Nations, 2006). 
3  Barnett, M., H. Kim, M. O’Donnell & L. Sitea, “Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?”, 
Global Governance, Vol. 13 No.1 (2007), p.35-58; E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: 
Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings, ISS Paper 161 (Preto-
ria/Tshwane: Institute for Security Studies, 2008). 
4  See, for instance, Lift Liberia, Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, (Monrovia: Gov-
ernment of Liberia, 2008), p.171. 
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The second is that peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-
wide undertaking that spans several dimensions. There are different 
models or approaches, but most range from differentiating between 
three core dimensions to the more elaborate that list six to eight differ-
ent dimensions. The UN Secretary-General’s report No Exit without 
Strategy5 argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering 
the capacity to resolve future conflicts by: (1) consolidating security, 
(2) strengthening political institutions and (3) promoting economic 
and social reconstruction.6 Barnett et al. refer to the same three dimen-
sions as: (1) stability creation, (2) restoration of state institutions and 
(3) socioeconomic recovery.7 The World Bank has summarised these 
three dimensions as (1) security, (2) governance and (3) development 
and its President has linked it, in the Afghanistan context, to the coun-
terinsurgency principles of clear, hold and build.8 These are the same 
three dimensions that are reflected in the so-called 3D (diplomacy, 
development and defence) Whole-of-Government approach.9  
 
The UN’s Integrated Approach opts for a more elaborate list that in-
cludes: political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of 
law, social and security aspects.10 The UN’s Report of the Secretary-
General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict lists 
five areas of action, namely: (1) basic safety and security, (2) political 
processes, (3) basic services, (4) core government services and (4) 
economic revitalisation.11 The African Union’s Post-Conflict Recon-
struction and Development Framework12 lists five areas, which it 
terms constitutive elements, but it also adds gender as a self-standing 
element. When comparing these it becomes clear that there is broad 
convergence around the core dimensions of peacebuilding and these 
are summarised here in Table 1.  
 
 
                                                 
5  No Exit Without Strategy, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2001/394 (New York: 
United Nations, 20 April 2001). 
6  M.W. Doyle, “The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace”, Global Governance, Vol. 
13 No. 1. (2007), p.9. 
7  Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell & Sitea, “Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?”, p.49. 
8  R.B. Zoellik, The Key to Rebuilding Afghanistan, The Washington Post (22 August 2008), 
p.17. 
9  S. Patrick & K. Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts: Assessing “Whole of Govern-
ment” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 
p.56. 
10  Revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 2006, and released 
under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006 (New York: United Nations, 
2006). 
11  Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, 
S/2009/304 (New York: United Nations, 11 June 2009). 
12  AU, Policy Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) (Ad-
dis Ababa: African Union, 2006). 
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Table 1: The Dimensions of Peacebuilding 
 
 
Providing a Safe and Secure Environment 
Protection of Civilians 
Mine Action 
Security Sector Reform 
Disarmament & Demobilisation 
Security & 
 Rule of Law 
Police, Corrections & Judicial Reform (Rule of Law) 
Support the Peace Process & Oversee the Political Transition 
Political Participation, National Dialogue & Reconciliation 
Electoral Capacity Building and Oversight (Observation) 
State and Government Institutions, Public Administration & 
Civil Service Capacity Building (Governance) 
Extend State Authority throughout the Territory 
Political &  
Governance 
Conflict Management Capacity 
Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports, Electricity, 
Telecommunications 
Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population 
Registration 
Stimulating and Facilitating Economic Growth and  
Employment 
Socio-economic 
Recovery 
Strengthening Civil Society 
Human Rights Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring 
Humanitarian  
Assistance 
Emergency and Early Recovery Services in the Areas of Food, 
Water & Sanitation, Shelter, Health, Protection and Returns of 
Refugees/IDPs 
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Humanitarian assistance should be highlighted as one function that is 
treated differently in the various models. There is widespread recogni-
tion that it is independent from the other functions in that it does not 
share peacebuilding’s essential conflict prevention objective. 13 Some 
models, including the UN’s Integrated Approach, nevertheless include 
humanitarian assistance within peacebuilding as a function that takes 
place independently, but parallel to, the other peacebuilding dimen-
sions. The UN approach argues that it needs to be included in the 
overall framework in order to be factored into planning and coordina-
tion mechanisms.14  
 
The third aspect relates to the tension that exists between independ-
ence and interdependence. The various peacebuilding actors exist as 
independent agents with their own mandates, programmes and resour-
ces, and yet they are also interdependent on each other to achieve their 
respective objectives, and that of the overall peacebuilding undertak-
ing. Most peacebuilding-related programmes only make sense as part 
of a larger system of related programmes. Disarmament and demobili-
sation programmes, for instance, rely on the assumption that others 
will provide a series of reintegration programmes, and they all rely on 
the assumption that there are other programmes in place that will cre-
ate security, improve opportunities for education and healthcare, and 
create employment for ex-combatants or alternative opportunities for 
sustainable livelihoods. Such a network of programmes exist both as 
independent programmes with their own sources of funding and sepa-
rate implementing arrangements, and as a network of interdependent 
programmes whose combined output produces an outcome that their 
individual efforts could not have achieved independently. This duality 
between the independence and interdependence of the various pro-
grammes, agents and dimensions that constitute the peacebuilding sys-
tem lies at the core of the coherence dilemma. This tension can not be 
resolved only managed on a case-by-case basis taking into account the 
local context, and pursuing coherence is thus about managing interde-
pendences at a specific point in space and time.  
                                                 
13  Various models, such as: The Utstein Report (D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework 
for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, Overview Report of the Joint Utstein 
Study on Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004 (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2004), the UN’s Integrated Approach (Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions) and 
NEPAD’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa include humanitar-
ian assistance. Many in the humanitarian community argue, however, that humanitarian 
assistance fall outside the scope of peacebuilding, and should not be included in peace-
building models. See for instance E.A. Weir, Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated 
Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative, Monograph No. 4, (Accra: KAIPTC, May 
2006). The humanitarian dimension is included as part of the larger peacebuilding frame-
work throughout this paper and in Table 1, as per the UN concept, with due regard for the 
principle of the independence of humanitarian action, as recognised in paragraph 10 of the 
Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions. 
14  Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General (New York: 
United Nations, 9 December 2005) and Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration, Deci-
sions of the Secretary-General, Policy Committee (New York: United Nations, 25 June 
2008). 
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The fourth aspect relates to our perspective of time. It is now recog-
nised that peacebuilding is a long-term process, and that a longer and 
more sustained international commitment is more necessary than was 
understood a decade ago.15 Failures to sustain the international en-
gagement in countries like Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone were seen 
as an important factor in the relapse into violent conflict experienced 
in these cases. A causal link was thus made between sustained interna-
tional attention and lasting peace processes. This longer-term time 
frame for peacebuilding was agreed on at the World Summit in 2005 
and resulted in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commis-
sion, with the aim of ensuring that the international community in ge-
neral, and the UN in particular, remains engaged in countries during 
the peacebuilding stage.16 
 
This was regarded as necessary because the UN Security Council’s 
attention tended to be focused on those crises where the UN has a di-
rect stake, usually in the form of a UN peacekeeping operation. When 
such operations came to an end, the countries in question moved off 
the Security Council agenda. The UN Peacebuilding Commission now 
represents not only a specific focus on peacebuilding, but it also helps 
to keep countries where there no longer is a UN peacekeeping pres-
ence, but where the peace is still fragile and reversible, on the UN 
agenda.  
 
After the first five years of the UN Peacebuilding Commission one 
can argue that this approach has had the desired effect in Burundi and 
Sierra Leone. Whilst both peace processes are still fragile, and thus 
not yet self-sustainable, the UN Peacebuilding Commission has been 
able to keep them on the agenda of the UN system. In so doing, the 
PBC has ensured that they have received more international and re-
gional attention and focus than would otherwise have been the case, 
and this has contributed to preventing a relapse into conflict over this 
period.17 
 
There is also a recognition that although peacebuilding requires a 
long-term commitment, there is also a need for immediate and short-
term gains to solidify the peace, build confidence in the peace process 
and stimulate a vision of a better future.18 This has resulted in prac-
tices such as the now standard inclusion of funds for quick impact pro-
                                                 
15  N. Tschirgi, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Chal-
lenges, p.9. 
16  A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004) 
and In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All. 
17  Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission 
(New York: New York University’s Center on International Cooperations and the Interna-
tional Peace Institute, April 2008), p.16. 
18  M. Wesley, “The State of the Art on the Art of State Building”, Global Governance 14 
(2008), p.377.  
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jects in UN peacekeeping budgets,19 and an acceptance that some  
aspects of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 
Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) should be 
funded out of the assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping ope-
rations budget. In fact, the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuild-
ing in the immediate aftermath of conflict, of June 2009, focuses ex-
clusively on this part of the peacebuilding agenda of the UN.20 More 
needs to be done to give meaning to the urgent need for short-term 
peace dividends, but the immediate aftermath of conflict has been the 
traditional area of focus of the UN Security Council, at least from a 
peace and security perspective. The Secretary-General’s report is thus 
a useful reminder of the importance of laying a firm foundation for 
sustainable peacebuilding, and not missing many opportunities in 
these early phases to capitalise on the goodwill and momentum of the 
peace process. 
  
This section attempted to summarise some of the major developments 
in peacebuilding thinking over the last half decade. However, the 
number of peace processes that have relapsed into conflict, and the 
number of situations that are still highly fragile, remind us that there 
still are more questions than answers, and that we need to give urgent 
and focused attention to a number of critical aspects of international 
peacebuilding, if we want to improve the success rate, sustainability 
and overall impact of our peacebuilding efforts. In the next section we 
will focus on the first of the three areas this paper will address, namely 
the need to improve and expand our understanding of the UN ap-
proach to peacebuilding so that it can become a meaningful platform 
for sustained action. 
 
 
 
3. The Need for a Conceptual and  
Operational UN Peacebuilding Model 
The term peacebuilding was introduced in 1992 by then UN Secre-
tary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace, as: “ac-
tion to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict”.21 Peacebuilding was 
explained as “the counterpart of preventive diplomacy”, where pre-
                                                 
19  UN, ‘Policy Directive on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)’, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (New York: United Nations, 12 February 2007). 
20  Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of 
Conflict, A/63/881 (New York: United Nations, 2009). 
21  UN, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (New 
York: United Nations, 1992), para.21 
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ventive diplomacy was seen as action aimed at avoiding a crisis whilst 
peacebuilding is aimed at preventing a recurrence.22 In the Agenda for 
Peace, conflict prevention and peacebuilding was thus juxtaposed at 
the opposite ends of the conflict management spectrum, with preven-
tive diplomacy representing the first or opening stage of an interven-
tion, and peacebuilding the last or closing stage.  
 
According to this model, the UN response to conflict, in its simplest 
form, is first to prevent conflict (preventive diplomacy). If that fails, 
the next step is to make peace (peacemaking) by gathering all the par-
ties around the negotiation table. If a cease-fire or an agreement is 
reached, the UN could deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the 
cease-fire and to otherwise assist with the implementation of the  
agreement. Lastly, the UN will assist to rebuild the country with a spe-
cific focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to ensure 
that the conflict does not re-occur again (peacebuilding). 
 
This original conceptualisation and chronological model have an en-
during impact and many people at the policy, funding and operational 
level still have these original concepts in mind when working with 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues. In fact, the UN Secre-
tariat has institutionalised the model, with separate departments for 
prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and, with the new Peace-
building Support Office (PBSO), now also for peacebuilding. Bureau-
cratic dynamics among these units ensure that there is a healthy dose 
of competition for resources and influence among them, and although 
they cooperate in many meaningful ways, these tendencies also rein-
force their different identities and thus the very notion that prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are separate phases or 
facets of the peace process.  
 
However, over the past decade and a half our understanding of the 
peace instruments highlighted in the Agenda for Peace has been re-
fined through practice and analysis, and they are now broadly under-
stood to be interdependent and interlinked aspects of the same pro-
cess, rather than chronological steps or stages in a linear conflict man-
agement continuum. In this context there is a need to revisit and clar-
ify exactly what it is that the various actors, and especially the United 
Nations, understand with the peacebuilding concept. This is not mere-
ly of academic interest. Conceptual confusion leads to policy vague-
ness, duplication, omission and competition. It complicates resource 
mobilisation and causes budgetary confusion, and at the operational 
level it contributes to inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and thus ulti-
mately to loss of impact and sustainability. 
 
                                                 
22  An Agenda for Peace, para. 57. 
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We should also not shy away from the fact that the way peacebuilding 
is understood is not only a technical debate, but also a political issue. 
The debate should thus not be confined to those professionally en-
gaged in peacebuilding. It should first and foremost be actively pur-
sued as an international diplomatic debate. When the peacebuilding 
concept was introduced in An Agenda for Peace, it reflected an opti-
mism that existed in the immediate post-Cold War period for collec-
tive third party intervention.23 There was a sense in the period between 
the end of the Cold War and before 9/11, that collective third party 
peacebuilding could represent a new era of benevolent international 
intervention.  
 
The sense of optimism has since evaporated and has been replaced by 
a largely divided perception of peacebuilding. Some in the North, for 
instance the G8+, view peacebuilding as a tool for managing failed or 
failing states, and assisting them with establishing the values and 
structures that typify liberal-market democracies, which those in the 
North view as synonymous with responsible and stable sovereignty.24 
Some in the South, for instance those leading the Non-Aligned Mo-
vement and the G77, are sceptical and view peacebuilding as having 
the potential to harbour a new form of colonialism, which if un-
checked, can result in the neo-imperialist and capitalist exploitation of 
vulnerable post-conflict societies.25 It is important not to shy away 
from this debate, but to create forums where those with opposing 
views can shape each other’s understanding of peacebuilding, and 
where the different schools of thought can develop a better under-
standing of the interests and issues that drive their respective ap-
proaches to peacebuilding.  
 
The international community in general, and the UN in particular, will 
find it difficult to develop a coherent peacebuilding system in the con-
text of a deeply divided international diplomatic community. At wor-
se, the UN may find itself back in the Cold War context where contra-
dictory interests and disagreement over the concept, content and pro-
cess of peacebuilding, for instance among members of the UN Secur-
ity Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, prevent the interna-
tional community, and especially the UN, from taking coherent action.  
 
The core of this debate should take place in the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission, but the Commission should also encourage and facilitate 
the debate in various regional forums, within the academic commu-
                                                 
23  N. Tschirgi, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Chal-
lenges, p.2. 
24  R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004); M. Barnett, H. Kim, M. O’Donnell & L. Sitea, “Peacebuilding: What 
Is in a Name?”. 
25  R. Paris, T.D. Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar State-
building (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), p.9. 
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nity, among civil society and within the context of the national dia-
logues that should shape the future of countries emerging out of con-
flict. There seems to be a tendency to avoid these debates for fear of 
stimulating confrontation among UN Member States, but the reality is 
that the Member States are polarised on these issues into the broad 
North/G8+ vs. South/NAM/G77 groupings, and that without debate, 
they are trapped into these positions without having the opportunity to 
educate each other about the reasons why these groupings have such 
divergent views on these matters. It is understandable why the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission shied away from being the forum for this 
debate during the first five years of its existence, but there are several 
reasons why it should now take on this task as a central focus of its 
agenda and role. 
 
Firstly, the current lack of a common understanding of what UN 
peacebuilding entails and how it should be pursued has been a major 
contributing factor to incoherent international and national action, and 
has ultimately contributed to a poor record of sustainability. Secondly, 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission is the only UN body focused sole-
ly on peacebuilding and there is thus no other body in the UN system 
where this debate should rather take place. Thirdly, the UN Peace-
building Commission represents a neutral meeting ground between the 
interests and issues normally dealt with by the UN Security Council 
and ECOSOC, between North and South, and between the internal and 
external actors. This is one of the greatest comparative advantages of 
the Peacebuilding Commission and this unique position should be 
used to facilitate and encourage dialogue amongst these key stake-
holders. And lastly, peacebuilding is not a static concept that can be 
defined by a committee, endorsed by an assembly and then operation-
alised. It needs to be continuously refined, improved and operational-
ised. In fact, as the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission has 
shown to date, there is a degree to which peacebuilding will take on a 
unique meaning in every specific context that it is applied, and this 
duality and tension between what is common and what is context-
specific, is partly what needs to be captured in our refined understand-
ing of what peacebuilding is. The Commission is ideally placed to 
take on the task of developing and refining a conceptual and opera-
tional model of peacebuilding for the UN system, and this should be a 
responsibility that is central to its long-term work plan and identity. 
 
The UN Policy Committee, in its May 2007 deliberations, approved a 
useful working definition of peacebuilding: “Peacebuilding involves a 
range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing 
into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and de-
velopment. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to 
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the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national owner-
ship, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and 
therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the 
above objectives.”26  
 
In broad terms we can thus say that peacebuilding aims to consolidate 
and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go 
beyond merely preventing violence (negative peace).27 It aims to ad-
dress the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the condi-
tions for a just social order (positive peace).28 However, this broad 
understanding of peacebuilding becomes confused when, in practice, 
we use the same peacebuilding concept in two very different opera-
tional models, namely targeted and systemic peacebuilding. Much of 
the conceptual confusion comes about when these two distinct opera-
tional models of peacebuilding are muddled together, and the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission is well placed to consider these two mod-
els and how they are interrelated. In fact, the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion itself struggled with these two concepts and found, for instance in 
Burundi, that its work at the level of the Integrated Peacebuilding 
Framework on the one hand, and at the level of the Peacebuilding 
Fund on the other, brought these two distinct, but interrelated ap-
proaches to peacebuilding in conflict with one another. The Peace-
building Commission will thus have to resolve the tension between 
these two models, both within its own work, as well as in the guidance 
it generates for the UN system as a whole.  
Targeted Peacebuilding 
Targeted peacebuilding refers to activities aimed at addressing urgent 
or imminent risks to the peace process, and it usually takes the form of 
a specific time-bound programme aimed at addressing a particular 
need or risk. These can be identified as short- to medium-term conflict 
factors that may potentially impact negatively on the peace process, 
and that can be addressed through specific targeted programme re-
sponses. This is also referred to as preventative peacebuilding or in-
strumental peacebuilding in that it refers to programming that is meant 
to avoid a relapse into conflict. Some donors now have funds specifi-
cally earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds would most likely 
be used to finance specific programmes in this category. The activities 
supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund typically also fall in this  
category and are aimed at addressing specific peace consolidation 
                                                 
26  Quoted in E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding 
in Transitional Settings, 2. 
27  C. Call, The Problem of Peacebuilding: How UN Thinking has Evolved in Recent Years 
(New York: DPA, 2004). 
28  For an explanation of negative and positive peace, see J. Galtung, “Twenty-five years of 
peace research: ten challenges and some responses”, Journal of Peace Research, 22(2) 
(1985). 
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needs that have either remained unfunded, or under-funded, or that 
have newly emerged.  
 
The time frame for targeted peacebuilding is necessarily short- to me-
dium-term, because it is focused on immediate or imminent threats to 
the peace process. Examples of targeted peacebuilding programmes 
include conflict resolution training and capacity building, the devel-
opment of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention, 
such as the Peace Commission in Southern Sudan or the Ituri Pacifica-
tion Commission, support for civil society or women’s groups to par-
ticipate in peacemaking initiatives, and support for national reconcilia-
tion initiatives, including aspects of transitional justice. Some donors 
would also include support for specific programme activities that form 
part of, or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR), Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in this 
peacebuilding category. However, in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Libe-
ria we have also noted that some of the activities earmarked in this 
category may appear to be very similar to traditional development  
categories, such as youth employment, infrastructure development and 
basic social services. This is because the frustrations with the lack of 
progress in these areas have become so critical in some of these com-
munities that it has become a source of a potential relapse into violent 
conflict, and urgent action is required to show that some of these 
needs are being met.  
 
Some donors do not earmark funds specifically for peacebuilding, but 
prefer to encourage a conflict-sensitive approach to development 
when working in conflict- affected countries. Conflict-sensitive devel-
opment programmes have a developmental objective, for example, 
poverty reduction, but are sensitive to the conflict environment within 
which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and 
management of the programme to avoid aggravating the situation. In 
some cases, the design of the programme can also be intended to pro-
actively support conflict prevention efforts, and in the latter case such 
activities are almost indistinguishable from targeted peacebuilding.29  
 
An important prerequisite for a targeted peacebuilding approach is an 
understanding of the risks to the peace process, and the conflict factors 
that characterise the conflict system. A Post-Conflict Impact Assess-
ment (PCIA) or another form of risk analysis should be undertaken as 
part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate targeted 
peacebuilding programmes. It is thus important to work towards a 
common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular con-
text are, from the earliest planning stages and continuously throughout 
                                                 
29  M.B. Anderson, Do No Harm, How Aid can Support Peace or War (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
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the life cycle of the peacebuilding system.30 Funding for, and capacity 
building towards, effective participation in a PCIA approach could 
also be regarded as a targeted peacebuilding activity. As with most of 
these processes the real value does not lie so much in the end-product, 
e.g. the PCIA report, but rather in the sustained focused interaction 
among stakeholders that was necessary to generate the product, be-
cause this process of interaction among stakeholders leads to an im-
proved and nuanced understanding of each other, and the situation at 
hand, and that deeper level of insight will have numerous spin-offs far 
beyond just the PCIA report. A network is created in the process, and 
the members of the network can continue to work together, or in 
smaller hubs, to resolve or manage issues that may subsequently 
emerge.  
Systemic Peacebuilding 
Systemic peacebuilding, on the other hand, emerges out of the total 
combined effort of the activities undertaken under the various peace-
building dimensions introduced earlier (see Table 1), and thus exists 
in the form of a system-wide or holistic process. This overall effort 
may sometimes be described as a strategy or vision, for example, in an 
integrated strategic framework such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) in Liberia or the Afghan Compact. There may be specific pro-
cesses and structures that facilitate the development, management and 
monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks and these may be pur-
posely funded.31 In general, however, support for systemic peace-
building occurs in a highly fragmented manner in that the various 
agencies that participate in, and contribute to, the overall process, each 
independently design, manage, monitor, evaluate and secure funding 
for their individual programmes. These activities are not necessarily 
identified as, or funded as, peacebuilding activities at the programme 
level, although some of the programmes discussed in the targeted  
peacebuilding section may be. Instead, they would be considered and 
funded as, for instance, development, human rights, or Rule of Law 
activities. It is when these activities are considered together, in the 
context of their combined and cumulative effect, over time, that their 
systemic peacebuilding identity emerges.32 
 
                                                 
30  E. McCandless, Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transi-
tional Settings, p.15. 
31  For instance, the Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) of the Results 
Focussed Transitional Framework in Liberia (C.H. de Coning, Civil-Military Coordina-
tion in United Nations and African Peace Operations (Durban: ACCORD, 2007), p.60, or 
the more recent Joint UN and Government of Liberia Joint Steering Committee that man-
ages the Peacebuilding Fund’s $15 million grant for Liberia (E. McCandless, Lessons 
from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings, p.7). 
32  de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated 
Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, p.14. 
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A strategic or integrated framework that is aimed at an overall strate-
gic vision for the systemic peacebuilding process, such as a conflict 
sensitive PRS, maps out the overall priorities and objectives of the 
systemic peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. Recent ex-
amples include the Results Focussed Transitional Framework (RFTF), 
interim IRSP and RSP in Liberia, the Peace Consolidation Strategy 
and PRSP in Sierra Leone, and the Integrated Peacebuilding Frame-
work in Burundi. Individual programmes become part of the systemic 
peacebuilding process when they contribute to, and are considered as 
part of, the overall effort directed towards achieving the objectives set 
out in the strategic vision. In some cases the individual agencies and 
activities may be conscious of their role in the overall framework, but 
in some cases this linkage is drawn only at the systemic level, for in-
stance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports.33 This does 
not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the 
programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their 
individual activities contribute to an overall systemic peacebuilding 
framework.  
 
There is debate over the extent to which a development activity such 
as poverty reduction or infrastructure development, e.g. the construc-
tion of a road, can be regarded as having a conflict prevention objec-
tive, and thus be considered to be part of a peacebuilding framework. 
The confusion lies in the perspective and context. An individual donor 
or implementing agent may not think of, or categorise the funding of, 
for example, the construction of a road, as peacebuilding from a pro-
gramme level perspective. However, from a systemic perspective, e.g. 
in the context of an integrated peacebuilding framework, the construc-
tion of roads may be regarded as an important element of a larger sys-
temic peacebuilding framework. It may create work, including for ex-
combatants, it may stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods 
by providing access to markets, it may stimulate local contractor ca-
pacity, it may open up outlying areas previously marginalised because 
of their inaccessibility, and assist in the extension of the authority of 
the state into those territories, and it may contribute to overall eco-
nomic growth, all of which are important aspects of an environment 
conducive to a successful peace process and thus preventing a relapse 
into conflict.  
 
If the Peacebuilding Commission is serious about addressing the sus-
tainability dilemma of peacebuilding action then it should start by 
tackling this conceptual dilemma and its operational implementations 
head-on. The UN system needs conceptual clarity and a common un-
                                                 
33  The Utstein Study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show 
any link to a larger country strategy (D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for 
Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, p.16). 
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derstanding of the UN’s approach to peacebuilding. The Peacebuild-
ing Commission, with support from the Peacebuilding Support Office, 
should be the principle policy-making body on peacebuilding in the 
UN system, and in so doing, should be responsible for conceptualising 
peacebuilding in the UN context, and for determining overall UN 
strategy and policy direction on peacebuilding in the UN system.  
 
This implies that the principle function of the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion should be to produce strategic direction and supporting policies 
on peacebuilding to the UN system. It also implies that the Peace-
building Support Office should have the resources and skill set to sup-
port the Commission in carrying out this function, and that it should, 
in addition, be the main repository for expert knowledge on peace-
building in the UN system. One of the important functions of the 
Peacebuilding Support Office should thus be to identify and research 
lessons and best practices, and to transform these into policy advice. 
 
 
 
4. The Need for Enhanced Coherence 
as a Critical Factor in Sustainable 
Peacebuilding 
A large number of evaluation reports34 and research studies35 that have 
analysed the record of post-Cold War peacebuilding efforts have iden-
tified significant problems with coherence and coordination, and have 
found that this has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability of the-
se operations to date. For example, the Joint Utstein Study of peace-
building, that analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the 
last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, 
what it terms a strategic deficit, as the most significant obstacle to sus-
tainable peacebuilding.36 The Utstein study found that more than 55% 
                                                 
34  Amongst others, A. Cutillo, International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Con-
flict: A Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding (New 
York: International Peace Academy, 2006); N. Dahrendorf, A Review of Peace Opera-
tions: A Case for Change (London: King’s College, 2003); and A. Donini, The Policies of 
Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda, Occasional Paper 
#22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies (Providence: Brown Univer-
sity, 2002). 
35  For instance, Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From Congo to Iraq 
(Washington D.C: Rand Corporation, 2005); R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace  
After Civil Conflict; and S.J. Stedman, E. Cousens & D. Rothchild (eds.), Ending Civil 
Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 
36  Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, 
p.16. 
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of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger coun-
try strategy.  
 
The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted 
today in the international multilateral governance context. There is 
now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented pro-
grammes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a 
lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, 
reduced capacity for delivery, and thus impact.37 In this paper, ‘coher-
ence’ is understood as the effort to direct the wide range of activities 
undertaken in the political, governance, development, human rights, 
humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding 
system towards common strategic objectives.38  
 
There is a widely held assumption that a more coherent approach, that 
manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated system-wide 
effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable 
impact on any given peacebuilding process. It is important to recog-
nise, however, that the highly dynamic and non-linear nature of com-
plex systems implies that coherence can never be fully attained.39 It is 
possible, however, to distinguish between systems where there is less, 
or more, coherence, and pursuing coherence should thus be under-
stood as an aspiration that can be measured only in degree, not in end 
states.  
 
Coherence also needs to be understood in the context of the natural 
tensions and inherent contradictions between the various peacebuild-
ing dimensions and among the different peacebuilding actors.40 The 
agencies that are responsible for programmes and campaigns may  
often have to settle for ‘second best’ or ‘partially coherent’ solutions 
in order to establish a workable foundation for cooperation.41  
 
We can distinguish between four elements of coherence in the peace-
building context, namely: (1) agency coherence, i.e. consistency 
among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the 
internal consistency of a specific policy or programme; (2) whole-of-
government coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions 
of the different government agencies of a country; (3) external coher-
ence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various inter-
                                                 
37  OECD, “Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development”, OECD Observer (2003). 
Available on www.oecd.org, accessed on 10 May 2007. 
38  de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated 
Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, p.4. 
39  P. Cilliers, “Why We Cannot Know Complex Things Completely”, Emergence, 4 (1/2) 
(2002), p.83. 
40  Paris & Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuild-
ing. 
41  de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated 
Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, p.4 
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national actors in a given country context (harmonisation); and (4) in-
ternal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the policies of the 
local and international actors in a given country context (alignment). 
Agency Coherence 
Agency coherence refers to consistency among the policies and ac-
tions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a 
specific policy or programme. Consistency in this context refers to 
one agency working at cross-purposes with itself. This does not imply 
that there is no room for differences and debate during the policy for-
mulation and review process, but once a policy or intervention has 
been agreed on it needs to be implemented in such a way that all the 
different elements of the agency contribute to the overall objective in 
a complementary fashion. 
Whole-of-Government Coherence 
Whole-of-government coherence refers to consistency among the poli-
cies and actions of different departments and agencies of the same 
government or multilateral institution. The Canadian Government’s 
so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) concept is the 
classical example, and is aimed at ensuring that its peacebuilding in-
terventions are supported coherently by all the relevant arms of gov-
ernment.42 At the multilateral level the United Nations, European Un-
ion, African Union and NATO are each engaged in various initiatives 
aimed at improving coherence. Integration was one of the central 
themes of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Opera-
tions, the so-called Brahimi Report.43 The Secretary-General, in his 
comments on the Report, called for a plan that can help the different 
parts of the UN system to work together to develop country-specific 
peacebuilding strategies that are coherent, flexible and field driven.44 
The UN’s Integrated Approach, that has subsequently been developed, 
refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the 
planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the 
UN family are integrated into a single country-level UN system, when 
it undertakes complex peacekeeping operations.45 The UN Peacebuild-
ing Commission can play an important role in facilitating and encour-
aging whole-of-government coherence in the UN system when it 
comes to peacebuilding.  
                                                 
42  Patrick & Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts: Assessing “Whole of Government” 
Approaches to Fragile States, p.56. 
43  UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 
44  UN, Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-
General, A/58/382 (New York: United Nations, 19 September 2003). 
45  UN, Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration. 
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External Coherence  
External coherence refers to the harmonisation of policies and actions 
among the external actors in a given country context. One area which 
is particularly relevant is the relationship among donors, both bilateral 
and multilateral, and addresses the need for donors to harmonise their 
policies and practices so as to limit the transaction costs associated 
with their support. The Peacebuilding Commission provides the donor 
community with an additional meeting place where they can further 
improve their attempts to foster coherence. The added advantage of 
the Peacebuilding Commission is that it provides a forum not only for 
the security-development linkages, and the internal-external debate, 
but it also brings all donors interested in a specific country together.  
Internal/External Coherence  
Internal/External coherence refers to the alignment of the policies and 
actions between internal and external actors, especially at the strategic 
framework level, in a given country context. The need for overall stra-
tegic frameworks is widely recognised and accepted but poorly ap-
plied in practice. As the Utstein and other recent studies sited have 
pointed out, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy is, in fact, 
a critical shortcoming in most past and contemporary peacebuilding 
systems. The first prerequisite for coherence in any peacebuilding sys-
tem is the development of an overall strategic framework. Without it 
the various peacebuilding agents have no benchmark against which 
they can judge the degree to which they are coherent with each other 
in the context of an overall strategic framework.46 The degree to 
which such strategic frameworks are currently absent goes a long way 
to explaining the lack of coherence evident in past and present peace-
building systems. The work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 
the context of internal/external coherence and strategic frameworks 
are thus critical for sustainable peacebuilding, and should be an im-
portant part of its long-term agenda. 
Limits of Coherence  
Persistent evidence-based feedback from the field indicates that at the 
operational and tactical levels, many of the assumptions we have 
about coherence are, at best challenged, and at worse, flawed. The re-
search and evaluation data sited earlier in this paper indicate that  
peacebuilding efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-
rooted coherence and coordination dilemmas. For instance, Paris and 
Sisk argue that peacebuilding should be understood as inherently con-
tradictory, with competing imperatives facing the internal and external 
                                                 
46  de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated 
Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, p.16. 
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actors, both between and among themselves, that constitute “vexing 
policy dilemmas”, that require trade-offs between multiple mandates, 
needs and priorities without any obvious solutions.47  
 
The empirical and theoretical evidence thus indicate that there is much 
less room for coherence than generally acknowledged at the policy 
level. The result is that the policy debate is setting itself overly ambi-
tious targets for coherence that is impossible to achieve in reality. A 
more realistic understanding of the limitations of coherence and the 
inherent contradictions in the system will allow the international 
community to adopt a more sober approach to coherence and to set 
itself more humble goals. The UN Peacebuilding Commission would 
need to address this dilemma in its quest to develop a common UN 
system-wide approach to peacebuilding, and recognise that one of its 
own roles in this process is to provide a neutral and impartial market-
place where trade-offs and transactions among stakeholders can take 
place in a relatively safe and controlled environment. 
 
 
 
5. The Importance of Local Context 
and Local Ownership in Ensuring  
Sustainable Peacebuilding 
There is wide recognition that externally driven peacebuilding pro-
cesses are unsustainable.48 Whilst some argue for autonomous recov-
ery49, most developing and developed countries favour peacebuilding 
systems that are informed and determined by local context and sup-
ported by international expertise and resources.50 From this perspec-
tive, local context means that peacebuilding activities should be 
needs-based, and the priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery need 
to be informed by the dynamics of the host system, not by those pro-
viding assistance and support, through local ownership and meaning-
ful internal/external coordination. Achieving a balanced and meaning-
ful partnership between internal and external peacebuilding agents is 
thus one of the most important success factors for any peacebuilding 
                                                 
47  Paris & Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuild-
ing, p.1. 
48  See Building Effective Partnerships: Improving the Relationship between Internal and 
External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries (New York: Peacebuilding Forum Conference, 
7 October 2004), p.2. 
49  J.M. Weinstein, Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative 
Perspective, Working Paper 57 (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development 
(CGD), April 2005) 
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system. It is also one of the most difficult to achieve. In order to im-
prove the sustainability of peace operations, the Peacebuilding Com-
mission will need to make progress on three critical areas, namely  
local ownership, local context and local capabilities. 
Local Ownership and State Formation 
Local ownership in this context means that the future direction of a 
particular country is in the hands of the people of that country or, put 
differently, is not determined by external actors. One would imagine 
that a period of social upheaval and renewal should result in a new 
social contract among the people that address the shortcomings of the 
past and determine their common understanding of the role of the state 
and the relationship among the different communities that make up the 
society.  
 
In most contemporary peacebuilding systems, however, the focus has 
been on state building rather than state formation.51 The difference is 
that the former is focussed on the technical apparatus of the state, such 
as the security services, whilst the latter is aimed at facilitating the 
‘social contract’ between the people and the state and addressing the 
way in which a state is formed and how it relates to the people. State 
formation is concerned with aspects such as the separation of powers 
and the checks and balances on the powers of the various elements of 
the state.  
 
State building is too often narrowly focused on the executive branch. 
Peacebuilding today is overly associated with security sector reform 
and rule of law. These areas are popular because they are technical 
and lend themselves easily to the kind of programmatic interventions 
the external actors are used to. Most importantly they are not contro-
versial and thus welcomed by the governments in power. The result is 
that external actors invest in the instruments of governance, instead of 
the elements of the state, and this leaves the executive, and thus any 
government that comes to power, in a position where it is not ade-
quately kept in check by the legislative and judicial branches of the 
state. Peacebuilding that focuses only on the executive branch of the 
state is not a good recipe for a sustainable peace process, and may sow 
the seeds of future discontent.52 
 
The UN Peacebuilding Commission should refocus the local owner-
ship debate around state formation, rather than state building, and find 
innovative ways of facilitating the development of new social con-
                                                 
51  OECD, 2008, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fra-
gility to Resilience, Off-print of the Journal of Development, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 13. 
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17 August 2009. 
Clarity, Coherence and Context  25 
tracts among people and state in the countries it is engaged with. In 
this context the Commission needs to encourage processes that make 
the leadership accountable to the people, not to the international 
community. This implies a shift away from state building towards  
state formation, and will require an investment in facilitating national 
dialogue, and the development or reform of constitutional frame-
works. It also implies a renewed focus on aspects such as strengthen-
ing the overall sociopolitical framework, for instance the division of 
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial, and the streng-
thening of civil society and social capital in the form of a free press, a 
free and independent judiciary, as well as human rights, electoral and 
other independent commissions that perform a vital role in the func-
tioning of the overall sociopolitical framework.  
Local Context and External Legitimacy 
Local context means that peacebuilding needs to be informed by local, 
not international, needs, priorities and context. Again this is an obvi-
ous principle that few will challenge, but in reality it is so difficult to 
achieve that few have actually managed. There are two forces that 
work against this principle. The first is that the local actors are in dis-
array in the immediate aftermath of conflict and their ability to articu-
late a coherent set of needs and priorities remains weak for years 
thereafter. The second is that the external actors have a well-resourced 
and internationally legitimised system that thinks it is acting on local 
needs, when in fact, it is overtly influenced by previous experiences 
and internationally generated models and theories of change.53  
 
The international community should step back into a facilitation role, 
so that local actors can fill the vacuum and inform the needs analysis. 
Local actors must be empowered and encouraged to identify and ar-
ticulate their needs and priorities. International actors need to be 
trained in understanding and countering their own tendency to repli-
cate their last experience elsewhere and to overwhelm, or drown out 
the local voices. They need to be trained how best to facilitate and en-
courage local voices and capacities without undermining them. And 
local actors need to be trained and encouraged in how to identify and 
articulate local needs and priorities, how to facilitate local dialogues 
and discussions that can identify needs and priorities and how to reach 
out to and empower all the voices in society, including those that may 
not normally be heard in official discussions.  
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The true implications of taking local context into account may be dif-
ficult for the external system to accept. Local needs and priorities may 
be different from what the international system is willing or able to 
provide. Promoting norms that have a high priority for the donor 
community, such as human rights and gender equality may not be a 
priority for the local community, and the international community 
may not have the technical expertise or systems to provide support for 
local priorities such as small-scale animal husbandry and agriculture. 
At another level, local priorities my result in different time scales than 
what the international community is used to. For instance, local lead-
ers may seek an upfront investment in capacity building prior to im-
plementation of various medium- to long-term governance and devel-
opment initiatives, so that these programmes can be managed by local 
managers, whilst the international community may be under pressure 
to launch such programmes earlier in the process.  
 
The UN Peacebuilding Commission should take on the responsibility 
of tackling the vexing policy dilemmas generated by the implications 
and challenges of the local context debate. It can provide a space  
where they can be discussed and transacted, and it can be a forum for 
knowledge generation and research. None of the stakeholders benefits 
from leaving these issues unaddressed, especially if sustainable peace-
building is acknowledged as the common objective.  
Local Capacities and Social Capital 
Local capabilities in this context imply the recognition that any soci-
ety has developed a range of coping mechanisms that have been 
shaped and formed by local context and that can be utilised to manage 
or support processes aimed at dealing with various social challenges. 
The challenge is how to identify and work with such local capacities, 
without supporting or further entrenching the inequalities in the soci-
ety that may have contributed to the conflict. Peacebuilding tends to 
replace local social capital with external models or perceptions of the 
state, and the result it that we tend to undermine or destroy the little 
capacity that exists in a society and replace it with a weak and dys-
functional new capacity. We need to find new and innovative ways of 
working with existing social capacities, and perhaps transforming 
from within those that are problematic, rather than replacing them out-
right with new untested systems that then fail to provide an alternative 
service.  
 
For instance, state building tends to generate new or reformed central 
state capacities, especially in the rule of law and security contexts, and 
we tend to de-legitimise and sometimes even criminalise existing local 
social capacities in the form of traditional justice systems and local 
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security arrangements, without ensuring that an adequate alternative is 
in place. The net result is a drop in overall capacity because we are 
weakening the existing social capacity before offering a viable, credi-
ble and legitimate alternative. Whilst it may be the case that the exist-
ing structures are weak and unsatisfactory, at least they provide some 
level of service that should not be disrupted until such time as a better 
alternative is in place. An alternative approach may be to develop new 
systems that compliment and build on existing social systems, rather 
than replacing them. Where existing social systems are regarded as 
inappropriate, they can be encouraged to transform over time but one 
needs to recognise that such change needs to occur at a pace accept-
able to the local community for it to be sustainable.  
 
Capacity building needs to be transformed from the existing paradigm 
of replacing local capacity to one where existing local capacities are 
recognised as the basis from which new capacities can be developed. 
This approach should be informed by a recognition that local capaci-
ties have been shaped by local historic and sociocultural contexts that 
make it uniquely suited to the local context, and thus locally legiti-
mate. New untested capacities need to earn local legitimacy before 
replacing existing local capacities.  
 
Capacity building is a critical aspect of peacebuilding and the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission can work together with existing know-
ledge centres in, for instance, the UN Development Programme, to 
generate knowledge on capacity building in the specific peacebuilding 
context, and can then serve as a vehicle to disseminate this knowledge 
to stakeholders and to inform its work. Capacity building needs to be 
transformed from its current predominantly North-South knowledge 
and skills transfer approach to one where the local social capital and 
inherent capacities are recognised and used as a basis for further de-
velopment.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has focused on three challenges that should inform the 
2010 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, namely:  
 
(1) Improving our understanding of the peacebuilding concept 
through encouraging formal and informal debate, and the insti-
tutionalisation of a specific peacebuilding model for the UN 
system; 
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(2) Significantly stepping up efforts to improve system-wide 
coherence, including our understanding of the limits of coher-
ence; and 
(3) Meaningfully operationalising the principle of local owner-
ship, including finding more creative ways to balance the need 
for predictable international models on the one hand, and local 
context on the other. 
  
There is a need to revisit and clarify exactly what it is the United  
Nations understands with the peacebuilding concept. We should not 
shy away from the fact that this is not only a technical debate, but also 
a political issue. The debate should thus first and foremost be actively 
pursued as an international diplomatic debate. The UN Peacebuilding 
Commission is ideally suited to be the forum where such a debate 
should take place.  
 
Persistent evidence-based feedback from the field suggests that many 
of our underlying assumptions about coherence and integration are, at 
best challenged, and at worse, flawed. Our peacebuilding efforts are 
challenged by enduring and deep-rooted coherence and coordination 
dilemmas. There are pervasive fundamental differences in the man-
dates, value systems and core principles of some of the peacebuilding 
actors that cannot be resolved, only managed. The UN Peacebuilding 
Commission should provide a neutral and impartial marketplace  
where these trade-offs and transactions among stakeholders can take 
place in a relatively safe and controlled environment. 
 
Externally driven peacebuilding processes are unsustainable. In order 
to improve the sustainability of peace operations, the UN Peacebuild-
ing Commission will need to focus on three critical areas, namely  
local ownership, local context and local capabilities. Local context 
means that peacebuilding activities should be needs-based, and the 
priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery need to be informed by the 
dynamics of the host system. Peacebuilding that focuses only on the 
executive branch of the state is not a good recipe for a sustainable 
peace process, and may sow the seeds of future discontent. Interna-
tional pressure to invest heavily in the immediate aftermath of a con-
flict should be a focus developing capacity to absorb future invest-
ments. Capacity building should not be about replacing local capacity; 
instead local social capital should be the basis from which capacity 
can be further enhanced. 
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